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FROM CONSCRIPTS TO VOLUNTEERS
NATO’s Transitions to All-Volunteer Forces
Cindy Williams
Since the Cold War ended, twelve of NATO’s twenty-six member states havesuspended compulsory military service or announced plans to phase it out,
thus joining the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Luxembourg
in the family of nations with all-volunteer armed forces (AVFs). Most of NATO’s
other members are deeply reducing the number of conscripts they call up each
year, relying increasingly on volunteers to fill their military ranks.1
The national decisions to halt conscription were motivated by a variety of
factors. Whatever the paths to those decisions, however, advocates of military re-
form—including senior leaders in NATO—hold that the volunteer militaries
will be better suited to NATO’s post–Cold War missions and can deliver modern,
high-technology, expeditionary capabilities more cost-effectively than can their
conscript counterparts.2 Some hope that switching to
the “small but solid” volunteer model will free up
money in payroll and infrastructure accounts that can
be reinvested in new military equipment, thus nar-
rowing the capabilities gap that has grown up between
the United States and its NATO allies.3 Unfortunately,
as the United States discovered when it ended con-
scription in 1973, the benefits of shifting to an AVF do
not materialize immediately, and the period of transi-
tion can be more costly and difficult than anticipated.
Ultimately, within a decade, the United States got
through its transition with good pay and educational
benefits, professional recruiting, improved conditions
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of military life, and other measures aimed at attracting and keeping high-quality
people. Like the United States at that time, European countries are seeking cre-
ative solutions to recruit, retain, and motivate the high-quality uniformed vol-
unteers they need and to encourage them to depart when their services are no
longer required. The economic, demographic, labor, and social environments
within which militaries compete as employers for qualified people differ from
country to country, however. As a result, both the appropriate solutions and the
difficulty of transition will vary, and the military benefits of AVFs may be more
difficult, more costly, and longer in coming in European countries than they
were in the United States.
This article looks at the transition to all-volunteer forces in the militaries of
NATO. It begins with a brief overview of changing conscription policies and the
factors that motivate the shift to an AVF. It then describes some of the problems
the American all-volunteer force encountered during its first decade and the ini-
tiatives the United States embraced to solve them. It continues with a look at the
problems encountered by Europe’s militaries as they shift, followed by a discus-
sion of key differences that may make U.S. solutions less effective in NATO Eu-
rope. It ends with an overview of initiatives in several European countries and a
brief summary.
THE EMERGENCE OF ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCES IN EUROPE
The United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Luxembourg share a decades-
long tradition of all-volunteer service. Since the end of the Cold War, six
nations—Belgium, France, Hungary, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain—
have ended conscription. The Czech Republic, Italy, Latvia, Romania, the Slo-
vak Republic, and Slovenia plan to phase conscription out within the next sev-
eral years (see table 1).
The decision to end compulsory service is a national one. A look at the factors
motivating the decisions to end conscription reveals both similarities and differ-
ences among European countries and between Europe and the United States.
In the United States, the choice was rooted in domestic politics and concerns
over social and racial inequities stemming from the draft system that prevailed
during most of the Vietnam War. Nevertheless, the deliberations that preceded
the decision were informed by studies of a far richer set of issues: social and de-
mographic factors, military effectiveness, economic efficiency, the role of
women in the military, the role of and prospects for reserve forces, and other re-
lated concerns.4 The choice to end conscription was particularly favored by
economists, who anticipated that a volunteer force would be less expensive in
terms of the opportunity costs (foregone wages combined with any preference
for civilian life) of individuals who would serve. Economists also predicted that
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Country Conscription
Number in
Active Forces
(Thousands)
Number in
Reserves
(Thousands)
Term of
Conscription
(Months)
Number of
Conscripts
(Thousands)
Share of
Conscripts in
Forces (%)
Belgium Suspended in 1994 39 14 None 0 0
Bulgaria Plans to keep 51 303 9 45 88
Canada
No peacetime
conscription
60 23 None 0 0
Czech
Republic
Phase out by 2006 40 N/A 12 19 48
Denmark Plans to keep 23 65 4–12a 6 25
Estonia
Plans to keep; AVF
under
consideration
6 24 8b 1 24
France Suspended in 2001 259 100 None 0 0
Germany
Plans to keep; in-
creasing volunteers
283 359 9c 93d 33
Greece Plans to keep 178 291 16–19 98 55
Hungary
Called last con-
script in 2004
33 90 6 23 70
Italy Suspend by 2007e 200f 63 10 40 20
Latvia Phase out by 2008 5 13 12 2 33
Lithuania Plans to keep 13 246 12 5 37
Netherlands Ended in 1996 53 32 None 0 0
Norway Plans to keep 27 219 12g 15 56
Poland Plans to keep 163 234 12h 81 50
Portugal End in 2003 45 211 4 9 20
Romania Phase out by 2007 97 104 6–12 30 31
Slovak
Republic
Suspend in 2006i 22 20 6j 8 34
Slovenia Phase out in 2004 7 20 7 1 18
Spain Ended in 2001 151 328 None 0 0
Turkey Plans to keep 515 379 15 391 76
United
Kingdom
Ended in 1962 213 273 None 0 0
United States Ended in 1973 1,434 1,212 None 0 0
TABLE 1
CONSCRIPTION POLICIES IN NATO COUNTRIES
Except for dates of conscription, figures are as of 2003.
Sources: Transatlantic roundtable September 2003; IISS, Military Balance 2003–2004; U.S. Defense Dept., Active Duty Military Personnel Strengths by Regional
Area and by Country (309A) (Washington, D.C.: 30 September 2003), available at web1.whs.osd.mil/mmid/M05/hst0309.pdf; NATO Parliamentary Assembly,
25–28 March 2003: Visit to Latvia and Estonia,www.nato-pa.int; NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 16–19 June 2003: Visit to Poland and Lithuania by the Defence
and Security Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities,www.nato-pa.int; NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Invited NATOMembers’ Progress on
Military Reforms, 2003 Annual Session, 146 DSCFC 03 E, www.nato-pa.int; and others.
a. Up to 24 months in certain ranks.
b. 11 months for sergeants and reserve officers; see NATO Parliamentary Assembly, “Invited NATO Members’ Progress on Military Reforms, 2003 Annual Ses-
sion,” 146 DSCFC 03 E, www.nato-pa.int.
c. May volunteer to extend service to a total of 23 months.
d. Includes some 25,000 service members who voluntarily extended their periods of conscription to total up to 23 months.
e. A government bill was presented in 2003 to accelerate the suspension of conscription to 2005.
f. Under the Professional Law, will reduce to 190,000 troops.
g. Plus refresher periods; for some, possibility of 6 months with follow-on service in Home Guard.
h. Will drop to 9 months in 2004.
i. Retain authority for 3-month conscription to fill any gaps in military specialties.
j. Beginning January 1, 2004.
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volunteers would be more cost-effective for the military, because of longer terms
of service, lower personnel turnover, reduced training costs, and the substitu-
tion of capital for labor.5
Advocates of military transformation cite the switch to an all-volunteer force
as a key enabler of the fundamental transformation in the U.S. military between
the end of the Vietnam War and the Persian Gulf War of 1991. Today, Pentagon
leaders seem united in their support for the volunteer model on military
grounds, and economic studies continue to inform policies related to the AVF in
the United States.6 Nevertheless, questions about the sustainability of the mili-
tary operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, together with concerns over the social
composition of the armed forces, have sparked renewed debate.7
In Europe, economic arguments have been much less important to the na-
tional debates than they were in the United States, though budgetary consider-
ations generally have been important drivers. Furthermore, the military reasons
often have more to do with the availability of volunteers for foreign missions
and less to do with their suitability for high-technology warfare—perhaps
reflective of a European inclination toward the lower end of the military
spectrum.
Every European country that decided to adopt an AVF after the Cold War
ended did so in the context of its own political environment and for its own
unique reasons. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify some common themes for
each of four groups of countries: those in Western Europe that adopted AVFs
shortly after the end of the Cold War; those in Western Europe that made the
shift around the turn of the century; countries in Central and Eastern Europe;
and the Baltic states.
Belgium and the Netherlands were the first to end conscription. For them, the
choice was intertwined with the decision to downsize their militaries. The
long-term prospect of peace in Europe undercut the Cold War motivation of a
sizable conscript army as an element of national security, and ending compul-
sory service seemed part of the peace dividend. The Dutch decision was also in-
formed by a Priorities Review in 1993 emphasizing the creation of forces that
could be deployed quickly to respond to crises, which conscripts could not do.8
Christopher Jehn and Zachary Selden identify broad themes that motivated
the next four Western European nations—Spain, France, Portugal, and Italy—
to decide on the shift at about the turn of the century. The decision in those
countries generally involved a variety of factors, including the changed
geopolitical environment, economic pressures, changed military missions, and
domestic politics.9 The end of the Cold War meant an opportunity to reduce
military budgets substantially and cut back sharply on the number of people
serving in uniform (see figure 1). At the same time, conscripts—generally
3 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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precluded by law from
deployment outside the
country—were virtually
useless for the out-of-
area missions that NATO
began to emphasize and
that increasingly repre-
sented the main missions
of Europe’s militaries (see
table 2).
In addition, the military
drawdowns in those coun-
tries set off chain reactions
that eroded popular sup-
port for conscription. For
example, in post–Cold
War Spain, as the military shrank, so did the proportion of eligible youth called to
service each year. As fewer than half of the eligible young men were required to
serve, conscription appeared increasingly unfair to those relatively few who did
have to enter the armed forces. Both draft resistance and popular sentiment
against conscription swelled. Politicians seized on the issue during an election cam-
paign and halted conscription when they gained control of the legislature.10
For the Central and Eastern European members shifting to AVFs—the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Romania, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia—the consider-
ations were somewhat different. For them, the new security environment and
the prospect of collective defense in NATO made military downsizing possible;
developing affordable militaries that would be compatible with NATO made
downsizing and force restructuring necessary.11 The view of alliance leaders and
advisers that conscript forces were a vestige of the Cold War also played a role, as
did public opinion and increasing levels of draft avoidance.12
Finally, of the three Baltic states, only Latvia plans to end conscription during
this decade; in addition, Estonia is considering the shift to an AVF. Rather than
downsizing, those countries are creating new militaries from whole cloth. Their
decisions regarding compulsory service are still driven to some extent by con-
cerns for self-defense. In preparing for membership in NATO, however, they
have embraced the goal of integrating their forces into the alliance for mis-
sions in other parts of the world. The budgetary costs of new militaries and
signals from NATO and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly about the mili-
tary structures expected of new members have also been important factors in
their decisions.13
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FIGURE 1
ACTIVE-DUTY TROOPS OF SELECTED NATO COUNTRIES
Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance 2003–2004 (Washington, D.C.: Oxford
Univ. Press for the IISS).
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IMPROVING COST-EFFECTIVENESS
Whatever a nation’s mix of reasons for suspending conscription, advocacy in-
side and outside NATO has raised expectations that AVFs will ultimately lead to
improved military effectiveness and lowered personnel costs, thus narrowing
the transatlantic capabilities gap. At first glance, the numbers seem compelling.
In 2000, the United States spent just 27 percent of its military budget on person-
nel, compared with 34 percent in 1970, before the advent of the AVF.14 Today,
countries with AVFs generally devote smaller shares of their budgets to person-
nel expenditures and larger shares to developing and purchasing new equip-
ment than do those that retain conscription. For example, taken together, the
United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom—three NATO countries with
long-standing AVFs—devote 28 percent of their total defense budgets to
4 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
Country
Personnel in
Operations Outside
Country (Thousands)
Personnel in Active
Forces (Thousands)
Share of Active-Duty
Personnel in Operations
Outside Country (Percent)
Belgium 0.7 39 2
Bulgaria 0.5 51 1
Canada 2.6 60 4
Czech Republic 1.2 40 3
Denmark 1.6 23 7
Estonia Fewer than 100 6 Less than 1%
France 34.7 259 13
Germany 7.3 283 3
Greece 3.2 178 2
Hungary 1.0 33 3
Italy 9.7 200 5
Latvia 0.2 5 3
Lithuania 0.2 13 1
Netherlands 5.5 53 10
Norway 1.3 27 5
Poland 3.9 163 2
Portugal 1.4 45 3
Romania 1.6 97 2
Slovak Republic 0.9 22 4
Slovenia 0.1 7 1
Spain 4.2 151 3
Turkey 39.5 515 8
United Kingdom 47.0 213 22
United States 436.0a 1,434 30
TABLE 2
FORCES OF NATO COUNTRIES OPERATING ABROAD, 2003
Sources: IISS, Military Balance 2003–2004. Transatlantic roundtable September 2003; and others. Figures for personnel operating abroad in-
clude forces based permanently abroad as well as those deployed to military operations.
a. Active duty only; substantial numbers of reservists are also serving abroad. Includes some 26,000 personnel afloat, 109,000 serving in other
NATO countries, and 104,000 deployed to the Pacific theater.
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modernization. In contrast, the combined share of defense budgets dedicated to
modernization in all the other countries of NATO comes to just 16.6 percent.15
A somewhat more refined example compares NATO Europe’s three biggest
spenders: the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. While the three countries’
total defense budgets are roughly similar, Germany keeps more people under
arms than the other two countries (see figures 2 and 3). Of the three, only Ger-
many still has conscripts; France ended conscription in 2001 and is still in the
throes of transition. Germany’s conscripts add to the size of the Bundeswehr and
at the same time drain
money that would other-
w ise be avai lable for
modernization, with the
resu l t that Ger many
spends only one-quarter
as much money on equip-
ment modernization per
active duty service mem-
ber as the United King-
dom (see figure 4).16
More generally, the
U.S. experience appears
to validate the arguments
made in favor of all-volunteer forces on the basis of economic efficiency and
cost-effectiveness.17 Nevertheless, both the U.S. experience of the middle to late
1970s and the early indications from Europe suggest that the transitions in Eu-
rope will be more costly and difficult than many people foresee.
THE U.S. TRANSITION TO AN AVF WAS NOT EASY
In 1973, in the United States, the idea of shifting to an all-volunteer force was op-
posed by most senior military leaders, by many in Congress, by influential aca-
demics, and even by the New York Times.18 The first decade of the new force was
rocky and marked by calls to revert to some form of national service.
During the first three years of the AVF, the services generally met their overall
requirements for staffing and quality. During those early years, however, the
number of first-term enlistees who left the service before completing their con-
tracted terms of service rose from 26 percent to 37 percent, pushing turnover
rates (the annual requirement for enlisted recruits divided by the total size of the
enlisted force) to nearly 22 percent—far exceeding the 13 percent anticipated in
studies commissioned before the change.19 The high attrition rate meant that
more recruits were needed every year than anticipated. The constant churning
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TOTAL DEFENSE SPENDING (U.S. $ BILLION, 2002)
7
Williams: From Conscripts to Volunteers
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2005
of the force translated
into lower levels of expe-
rience and expertise in
units as well as higher
costs for recruiting and
training. As a result, the
share of the military bud-
get devoted to personnel
actually rose during the
first few years of the AVF,
despite a small reduction
in the size of the force.20
The next few years
brought the AVF close to
crisis. During that period, the U.S. economy grew briskly and private-sector
wages rose sharply. Military pay raises did not keep up, and budgets for recruit-
ing and advertising were cut back. Congress suspended the GI Bill, which pro-
vided college money for military veterans and had served as an important
enlistment incentive.
During that period, overall force levels were not a big problem. The services
generally came close to meeting their targets for overall staffing; the largest pro-
portional shortfall in total end strength was just 1.2 percent, in 1979.21 Unfortu-
nately, however, the quality of entering personnel plummeted. By 1980, nearly
50 percent of U.S. Army enlistees (compared with 28 percent in 1968) fell in the
bottom 30 percent of American youth in terms of cognitive aptitude, while only
29 percent scored above the median on the military entrance test (compared
with 49 percent at the end of the draft).22 Across the four services, the proportion
of low-scoring enlistees was worse than at any time since the Korean War.23
People with higher cognitive aptitudes do better at most military tasks; peo-
ple whose aptitudes fall in the bottom 30 percent have difficulty acquiring the
skills they need to be successful in the military. Thus, the high number of en-
trants who scored at the bottom of the test meant a lower-quality force, more
work for trainers and leaders, and greater attrition for the entrants, too many of
whom grew discouraged or were pressed to leave when they could not handle
their assigned duties. In addition, that period coincided with a time of reduced
investment in military equipment, resulting, some said, in a “hollow force.”
Some experts hold that problems stemming from reduced investment translated
into morale problems that compounded the difficulties of getting the AVF
started.24
4 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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Fixing the prob-
lems cost money, but
by the early 1980s a
combination of ef-
forts brought the U.S.
military out of its
transitional prob-
lems. Perhaps the
most important was
to raise military pay
for recruits and, later,
all ranks. Though pay
raises lagged during
the late 1970s, double-
digit increases in
1981 and 1982 brought pay levels for most military people above the seventy-fifth
percentile for people with similar levels of education and experience in private-
sector firms. Despite the widely reported “pay gap”of the late 1980s and the 1990s,
military pay continued to compare favorably with pay in the private sector
throughout the second and third decades of the AVF.25 Today, U.S. military pay
raises are explicitly linked to average wage hikes in the private sector.
In addition, the United States expanded bonus programs to entice high-quality
youth to join up and to induce people in critical occupations to reenlist. Follow-
ing the mistaken decision to reduce educational benefits, the nation developed a
new program that provides generous benefits for service members who wish to
go to college or technical school after leaving the military. The services were also
permitted to design educational bonuses of their own, an extra tool to attract
people they most want to bring in. Money for post-service education proved to
be particularly useful in attracting the high-aptitude people likely to be most
successful in the military.26
The services also worked to identify and put a stop to military traditions that
had little real value in a military sense but annoyed members greatly. Two emo-
tionally charged issues were haircuts and “KP” (kitchen police) duty, which re-
quired soldiers to handle menial tasks on a routine basis. The issues pitted
military commanders and veterans in Congress—who typically saw military
“buzz cuts” and menial tasks as rites of passage supportive of good order and
discipline—against the desires of recruits, who saw them as lifestyle detriments.27
Ultimately, the desires of recruits won out. While the services still enforce hair-
cut standards, they are more relaxed than during the draft era, and KP is largely a
thing of the past.
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Another initiative of the American transition was a focus on the quality of life
for military families. Recruiters emphasized the benefits of family housing,
health care, and cut-rate groceries, and money was added to budgets to improve
the facilities, goods, and services that families appreciate. In the late 1980s, the
Department of Defense opened its own child-development centers to provide
subsidized, high-quality child-care services on military bases. The initiative
probably paid off in improved recruiting and retention, but it also had a side ef-
fect that now raises costs for the military and complicates things both for com-
manders and for the people who serve—that is, the number of military people
with young families grew.
In addition, the United States greatly expanded the pool from which talented
recruits might be drawn by removing a 2 percent limit on the share of women in
the forces, opening numerous jobs to women and transforming the conditions
under which women serve. The proportion of women in the force rose from 1.9
percent in 1972 to 9.3 percent in 1983 and has since climbed to about 15 percent.
The proportion of minorities who serve also increased, as individuals found
better opportunities in the military than in the private sector.28
Finally, the military built a professional cadre of recruiters and invested
heavily in marketing research and mass-media advertising. The general sales
pitch emphasized the training and other opportunities the military can offer, a
rich array of family benefits, good pay, a chance for an adventurous and yet more
ordered life, as well as patriotism, a chance to be part of something important,
and other intangibles. Increased advertising and recruiting can be the quickest
and most cost-effective means to improve recruitment levels, which still typi-
cally lag when the economy heats up.
EUROPEAN MILITARIES ALSO FACE CHALLENGES IN TRANSITION
For European militaries that suspended the draft after the Cold War ended, the
transition pains are real, and costs are higher than anticipated. The problems are
compounded by the military drawdowns that preceded or accompanied the
adoption of AVFs.
Downsizing Brought Its Own Problems
Across NATO, maintaining forces with an appropriate distribution of people in
uniform with respect to rank, length of service, occupation, and ability level
during the downsizing of the past decade and a half was a challenge. The United
States managed its rank and experience profiles fairly carefully, through a system
of attrition, lowered recruitment, and financial incentives to leave. Nevertheless,
imbalances across occupations remain, with too few people in critical occupa-
tions and more than are needed in others. In some occupations, decisions made
4 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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during the drawdown had lasting effects. For example, the U.S. Air Force man-
aged the drawdown by cutting back on the number of pilots it trained, and after-
ward found itself short of pilots.29
In Canada, much of the downsizing was accomplished through attrition and
reduced recruiting. As a result, the Canadian Forces retained more older service
members than are needed for current operations and has too few younger ones
coming up the ranks. The older members, mostly married and settled in their
lives, resist deployment. Yet shedding the older members at this point would
leave too few experienced people to train incoming cohorts.30
Across Europe, strong programs of employee protection and generous retire-
ment systems kept the armed forces from separating excess older members (see
table 3). As a result, European militaries generally are left with too many older
officers for their missions and a lack of experience in the lower officer ranks. In
Belgium and the Netherlands, for example, most members of the professional
military saw service as a lifetime career. After the downsizing, both countries
were left with marked age and experience imbalances in their armed forces. Bel-
gium has forty-seven-year-old corporals, and an average length of service of
thirty-eight years. Leaders in both countries say that older members are not
suited for current missions. In addition, Belgium faces an imbalance across oc-
cupational specialties, with too few people with the aptitudes, technical ability,
and training needed. The Slovak Republic faces similar concerns.31
Romania found that its youngest and most capable members saw good op-
portunities on the outside and volunteered to depart as the military downsized,
leaving the forces with too many high-ranking, older officers. After attempting
to balance the pyramid based only upon rank and years of service, the Romanian
armed forces are now working to improve the overall quality of the force as
well.32
Shifting to AVFs Brought Unexpected Challenges
Across Europe, countries differ in their needs for military volunteers and the de-
mographic, economic, labor, and social environments in which their militaries
compete as employers. Thus, no two countries face precisely the same transition
problems. Nevertheless, a look across NATO Europe reveals a number of shared
challenges.33
• The level of military pay necessary to make the military competitive as an
employer is typically higher than foreseen before the transition.
• Attracting high-quality recruits can be more difficult than anticipated; the
private sector puts up particularly stiff competition for information
specialists and other people with technical skills.
W I L L I A M S 4 5
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Country Type of Plan
Retirement Age or Years of Service
(YOS)
Other
Belgium
Defined benefit: 75% of
salary beginning at re-
tirement age
45–61 for officers, depending on
rank and whether “flying person-
nel”; 56 for soldiers and NCOs not
flying personnel; 51 for NCO flying
personnel
Reduced benefit for those who leave
early; no pension for members in
the new contract status
Canada
Individuals and govern-
ment contribute into
pension plan; defined
benefit for service be-
yond 20 YOS; portable
contributions for fewer
than 20 YOS
Compulsory retirement recently
raised to age 60 from 55. Pensions
comparable to federal public service,
indexed for cost of living. Full pen-
sion after 28 YOS for officers, 25
YOS for NCOs; members can retire
after 20 YOS, with 5% penalty per
year short of thresholds. Before 20
YOS, members can transfer a share
of individual and government con-
tributions into another pension plan
Option for paid, reduced annuity
beginning at age 55–60 for those de-
parting before 20 YOS
Czech
Republic
Defined benefit and sev-
erance pay, with choice
of lump-sum severance
pay
Immediate annuity of 5% to 55% of
average salary after 15–30 YOS;
members revert to national pension
system after 60 years of age, receiv-
ing the difference between service
pension and other retirement pen-
sion if the service pension is higher
Members also receive severance pay
equal to 4–6 months’ salary for 15–
20 YOS; “Smart Money” option
equal to 2–18 months’ salary for 2–
26 YOS for members’ who serve for
fewer than 5 years or who opt out of
the service pension and severance
pay
France Defined benefit
Career members: retirement age de-
pends upon rank; deferred annuity
option (at retirement age) after 15
YOS for NCOs, 25+ YOS for officers
Contract members: immediate an-
nuity after 20 YOS; deferred annuity
option (at career retirement age) af-
ter 15 YOS
Germany Defined benefit
Contract soldiers: no retirement
benefit
Career personnel: lifetime annuity
equal to about 70% of last pay, be-
ginning at age 52–60 (depending on
rank)
Italy
Defined contribution
(under public employee
retirement system revised
between 1992 and 1997)
Retirement eligibility based on age
(usually 60 years) and YOS (cur-
rently in flux, consistent with re-
form of public sector retirement
system), but military contributions
of individuals who depart before
then can be credited to pension ac-
counts at the Italian Social Security
Administration
Contributions are portable to Italian
Social Security Administration for
early retirees; defined benefit and
mixed scheme retained for members
already in service at the time of the
reform; early retirement “seniority
pensions” optional until 2008
Norway Defined benefit 60
Option to retire at age 57 with 28
YOS
TABLE 3
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• Poor working conditions and inadequate facilities can scare recruits away,
but improving such conditions usually costs more money than has been set
aside for the purpose.
• Anticipated savings may not materialize as soon as expected—because, for
example, bases made redundant by the absence of conscripts cannot be
closed, for political reasons.
• The costs to train longer-serving volunteers (thus capitalizing on a key
advantage of volunteers) are usually higher than expected.
• Unanticipated costs, tight budgets, and budget cuts typically eat into
resources needed to implement the reforms surrounding the transition.
• Initially, uniformed leaders may not be motivated to make the transition a
success. The situation is exacerbated when tight budgets and unanticipated
costs prevent the improvements in equipment, infrastructure, and training that
were touted as benefits to be gained from the shift to all-volunteer forces.
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Country Type of Plan
Retirement Age or Years of Service
(YOS)
Other
Romania Defined benefit
Men: Age 55 (somewhat later for
flag officers) with 30+ years of work,
including 20+ YOS in military
Women: Age 55 with 20+ years of
work, including 10+ YOS in military
Partial pension for younger retirees
Slovak
Republic
Defined benefit and sev-
erance pay
Immediate pension equal to 30–
60% (depending on YOS) of average
pay of the best year from the final 10
years, after 15 or more YOS. In addi-
tion, retirement allowance equal to
2% of average pay of the best year
from the last 10 years, paid monthly
for a number of years depending on
YOS, for members with 5+ YOS
In addition, members with 5 or
more YOS receive severance pay
equal to Gross Pay + .5 x GP x
(YOS − 5)
Spain Defined benefit
Permanent members may stay to age
58; pension possible after 8 years as
temporary and 15 years as perma-
nent member
No pension for temporary volun-
teers, who must leave after 12 years
if they do not become permanent
soldiers
United
Kingdom
Defined benefit
Possibility of pension beginning at
age 55 with 15–20 YOS; pension
based on YOS and age at retirement,
up to national retirement age
Some limited pensions before age 55
United
States
Defined benefit
Immediate annuity for 20+ YOS;
annuity indexed to cost of living,
beginning at 50–75% of basic pay
near end of military career
Some members may choose a
lump-sum payment at 15 YOS, with
a lower annuity. Severance pay for
members separated involuntarily
before 20 YOS
TABLE 3 CONTINUED
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The resulting lack of high-quality recruits, high turnover rates, and unantici-
pated costs are reminiscent of the difficulties the United States encountered dur-
ing the first decade of its AVF.34 It would be easy to jump to the conclusion that
by adopting U.S. strategies, Europe’s militaries could get through their own
transition pains and bring about circumstances conducive to narrowing the mil-
itary capabilities gap within a decade.
IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES LIMIT THE TRANSFERABILITY
OF LESSONS
Unfortunately, the U.S. lessons may not apply to European militaries. Funda-
mental differences in demographics, social programs, educational systems, and
labor models mean that initiatives that worked in the United States may be less
effective in European countries.
For example, population growth in most of northern Europe is very low; in
southern, Central, and Eastern Europe, populations are declining.35 To maintain
a force of its current size through 2020, Spain would need every year to recruit
2.5 percent of the cohort between the ages of eighteen and twenty-eight years,
compared with just 1.6 percent in 2001 and 2002.36 In contrast, the United
States, where immigration makes up for relatively low birthrates, will need only
about 1.5 percent of its annual cohort to keep a force of a similar size. High rates
of conscientious objection may also dampen the success of recruitment efforts;
by the time the draft ended in Spain, for example, 75 percent of draft-age men
had identified themselves as conscientious objectors.37 Europeans may also balk
at joining the military with the prospect of being deployed in American coali-
tions that lack popular support.
While Europe’s immigrant minorities are often disadvantaged, they may also
come to their new homes with a negative image of the military.38 Moreover, if
immigrants perceive that they will not be welcomed by military leaders or that
opportunities for advancement that are open to others will not be open to them,
European militaries may find it more difficult to attract talented disadvantaged
youth and minorities than do the U.S. armed forces. Concepts of pay equity
across society, and between the military and other public employees, can also
make it difficult to improve military pay without raising political charges that
members of the armed forces have become mercenaries or are robbing other
public servants of their due.
In the United States, recruiting and retention surge during economic down-
turns, when jobs on the outside are not as plentiful as they are during boom
times. Because Western European nations typically offer more extensive public
programs for the unemployed, including cash benefits, health care, and other
social services, such economic cycles and high unemployment rates may not
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advantage their militaries as much. In general, Western European social safety
nets may catch people who in the United States would see military service as an
alternative to unemployment or part-time employment. Strong social
protections may also water down the appeal of family benefits offered by the
military.
Models of youth training and education also differ sharply between the
United States and most European countries. In the United States, vocational/
technical education can seem like a last resort for high school students in trou-
ble. In Western Europe, however, vocational schools and apprenticeships can be
engines of the trades. As a result, learning a skill in the military may not provide
the same opportunity to a European youth as to an American. Also, of course, in
countries where college is virtually free, U.S.-style college bonus programs hold
little attraction.
The immobility of European labor presents another striking difference.
Strong employee protections typically apply to the military as well as the private
sector, and many members of European militaries are represented by associa-
tions that amount to quasi–trade unions.39 Members of the professional forces
often expect to serve for a lifetime, whether or not the services need them that
long. In addition, even young people resist the moves that a military career can
entail. In the Bundeswehr, for example, it is not uncommon for service members
to keep their families at home and commute several hours daily or on weekends
because they prefer to live in the communities where they grew up. Such immo-
bility can make it difficult for the military to attract qualified people. Lower em-
ployee turnover rates in private firms may also make it more difficult for service
members to find new jobs when they leave the military.
For the countries new to NATO, the transformation from authoritarian rule
and centralized, command economies to transitional democracy and market-
based economies also makes for fundamental differences. The transformation is
utterly altering relationships between political authorities and the military, as
well as the role of the military in society. As recently as fifteen years ago, for ex-
ample, political officers in most Central and Eastern European militaries still ex-
ercised substantial influence within military units. Promotions based upon
Communist Party membership and ideology were not uncommon. Militaries
consisted primarily of officers and conscripts, with very few longer-serving non-
commissioned officers. The armed forces were called upon routinely as sources
of free labor for the agricultural sector.
Reforms in the new and invited member states call for depoliticization of the
armed forces, merit-based promotions, establishment of noncommissioned of-
ficer corps, and transformation of the roles and tasks of the armed forces. But
the communist legacy may translate into political resistance to initiatives, such
W I L L I A M S 4 9
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as market-based pay and bonuses and merit-based promotions, that can appear
inequitable to those raised in the former system.40 On the other hand, the fact
that the new member states are working from clean slates may make some
changes easier and cheaper for them than for either the United States or Western
Europe.
Finally, countries that are experiencing economic problems or working to
meet the limits on national budget deficits imposed by the European Stability
and Growth Pact may find it difficult to boost budgets for military pay and re-
cruiting resources as the United States did during the late 1970s, when it faced
mounting problems in transition to its AVF.41
EUROPEAN INITIATIVES TO SPEED THE TRANSITION
NATO nations seeking to expand the ranks of volunteers are undertaking initia-
tives to improve their capacity to recruit, retain, and motivate the high-quality
members they need and to encourage them to depart when their services are no
longer required. While the details are geared to the circumstances each country
faces, in broad outline the initiatives are generally consistent with those the
United States pursued during its transition period. But the measures differ in
their details, and they may result in longer and more costly transitions than
envisioned.
Improve Military Pay. Like the United States during its transition, European
countries in transition hope to make military pay more competitive and to use
bonuses or other supplements to basic pay to attract and keep people with key
skills and offset the negative impact of frequent deployments. For example,
France increased starting pay for privates. Belgium raised pay, introduced
changes that would allow for overtime compensation, and expanded allowances
for some occupational specialties. Spain added generous bonuses for volunteers
who renew their contracts and hopes to fund a large basic pay raise this year, de-
spite severe budgetary pressures. The Czech Republic instituted bonuses for
serving in some operations.42
While they recognize the importance of boosting military pay, however, Eu-
ropean countries generally have not moved to link military pay or pay growth
explicitly to the private sector (see table 4). In contrast, the United Kingdom,
with decades of AVF experience, benchmarks military pay directly against that
of the private-sector professions; the United States links its military pay raises to
average wage hikes in the private sector. Over time, the nations of continental
Europe may find it necessary to develop such explicit links. Doing so may cost
substantially more than their leaders currently anticipate.
5 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
16
Naval War College Review, Vol. 58 [2005], No. 1, Art. 3
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol58/iss1/3
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Country
Link to Other Public
Employees
Link to Private Sector Variation by Occupation or Duty
Belgium
No automatic link, but
General Staff works to
keep pay comparable by
education level to pay in
public sector
Through public-sector link; public-
sector pay is tied to average pay rates
in private sector
Differential pay for pilots, medical,
civil engineers, graduates of staff
colleges; skills-based special pays
for, e.g., pilots, divers, paratroopers;
special pays for operations
Canada
Not officially tied, but
tracks salaries in federal
civil service
No systematic tie, but salaries and
bonuses in some trades have been
boosted to be competitive with pri-
vate sector
Special pays for combat, deploy-
ment to theater, living abroad or in
the Far North
Czech
Republic
Yes No
Bonuses for hazardous positions,
missions abroad
France
Basic pay tied to public-
sector pay
No
Special pays, bonuses for, e.g., pilots,
submariners; living in Paris or
abroad; deployed to interventions
Germany Yes No
Bonuses in specified occupations;
daily bonus for service abroad, up to
92 euros per day
Italy
Pay is set separately for
defense and security-
sector employees
No
Operational allowance depending
on grade and assignment: people in
deployable units earn up to 50%
more than in administrative units;
elite units (e.g., airborne) up to 80%
more
Norway
Pay is negotiated for
public sector as a whole,
military included
No Special pay for pilots
Romania Yes No
Special pays for merit, based upon
recommendation of supervisor
Slovak
Republic
No No
Bonuses for hazardous conditions
from 1% to 6%
Spain
No explicit tie, but pay is
comparable with that of
other public-sector
employees
No
Special pays for, e.g., parachute, ma-
rine, pilot, submarine, units with ex-
peditionary capacity
United
Kingdom
No
Independent military pay review
body monitors pay in “equivalent”
private-sector professions to bench-
mark its pay recommendations;
adds an “X factor” to help offset the
difficulties of military life
Extra pay for some skills, e.g., pilots,
submariners
United
States
Annual pay raise often
linked to raise for federal
civilian workers
Current law requires pay raise in ex-
cess of average wage rise in private
sector; earlier law called for raise
somewhat lower than in private sec-
tor; law can be rewritten through
new defense legislation each year
Numerous special pays and bonuses
for specific occupations and duties
TABLE 4
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In some European countries, military pay is tied directly to the compensation
of other public-sector workers, and public-sector/military-pay equity is deeply
ingrained in national politics. In Germany, the linkage is so strong in the popu-
lar mind that people in uniform often call themselves “bureaucrats in uniform,”
which most American soldiers would find unflattering. The public-sector link
can make it difficult to raise military pay without also raising pay for all civil ser-
vants, whose rights are often protected by powerful unions. As a result, some
countries are seeking ways to boost military rewards through substantial non-
cash benefits, which they hope to justify based upon the military mission. In
France, for example, where the government currently provides very little housing
for service members, leaders are considering a sizable investment in housing, in
the hope that the new benefit will satisfy military people without raising equity
concerns for other public-sector workers.43 New government-provided housing
will greatly increase the cost of transition; unfortunately, providing it will almost
surely cost the government substantially more than it is worth to the members.44
Provide Incentives for Redundant Senior People to Leave the Service. Like the
United States in recent years, some European countries used financial incentives
to encourage members to leave the armed forces during the post–Cold War
downsizing. In France, for example, career officers were offered forty-five
months of basic pay, tax free, to resign.45 Romania provided a generous lump-
sum payment and retraining for civilian employment, while the Czech Republic
provided retirement allowances and retraining for civilian professions through
the military education system.46 While technically not a cost of transition to an
all-volunteer force, the large costs of separating redundant people seriously
complicate the budget picture for countries that adopted an AVF simulta-
neously with deep force reductions.
Improve Working Conditions. European militaries are also working to eliminate
traditions that annoy service members but do not improve military outcomes,
as well as to improve facilities and infrastructure. The Belgian military is review-
ing staff regulations with an eye toward adopting more flexible procedures and
improving morale.47 Spain’s Ministry of Defense has established a hotline for
soldier complaints.48 The Czech Republic is investing in infrastructure at its mil-
itary garrisons.49 For Germany, the modern equivalent of the U.S. “haircut war”
of the 1970s is a body-piercing jewelry war; the Bundeswehr has undertaken a
study to determine whether jewelry rules should be relaxed, as a symbol of a life-
style more attractive to today’s potential volunteers.50 Improving working con-
ditions by eliminating annoying traditions and regulations can be virtually cost
free from a budgetary point of view and a net win for everyone. Improving
5 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
18
Naval War College Review, Vol. 58 [2005], No. 1, Art. 3
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol58/iss1/3
infrastructure is expensive, however, a fact that may seriously delay and under-
mine the benefits of AVFs in Europe.
Improve Career Paths. Especially in NATO’s new member states, where a decade
ago the armed forces were made up almost exclusively of officers and junior-
ranking conscripts, militaries are working to create new corps of noncommis-
sioned officers with good prospects for careers in the military. Romania, the
Czech Republic, and the Slovak Republic are investing substantial sums in tech-
nical training and leadership development for these new senior enlisted person-
nel.51 In addition, the new member states plan to develop merit-based, more
transparent promotion systems.
In an attempt to make military careers more flexible, France has opened new
positions for specialists, who will be allowed to rise in rank and pay without tak-
ing up the duties of command. Romania is working to attract more officers with
civilian academic backgrounds.52 All of these initiatives are important to the
technologically capable militaries that NATO leaders hope will emerge with
all-volunteer forces.
Improve Quality of Life for Service Members and Their Families. Like the United
States during its transition, European countries are striving to provide family
benefits and other quality-of-life features to make military life more attractive
for volunteers. The U.S. slogan “recruit the soldier, retain the family” has be-
come popular among military personnel managers across Europe (see table 5).53
For example, France has expanded such family assistance programs as aid in
searching for schools, and it is considering new family housing. Romania also is
building new housing. The Czech Republic is working to improve family sup-
port; in addition, Prague has established a housing allowance and now permits
service members to rent on the open market. Germany and Belgium are opening
child-care centers for military families, and the Netherlands is considering it.
Several countries are working to reduce family separations.54
Family-friendly policies can provide important extra leverage in attracting
and keeping volunteers, but they have their drawbacks. The incentives they pro-
vide to marry and have children at an early age may not operate in the best inter-
est of the service member or the military. Because their costs do not appear in
the pay accounts, they may not be visible to decision makers or the public. More-
over, when family benefits are delivered as subsidies or as goods and services
provided directly by the government, as they often are, their value to recipients is
typically less than their cost to the government.55 To the extent that raising cash
pay raises insurmountable equity concerns with respect to other public employ-
ees, however, expensive family benefits may provide needed tools for Europe’s
militaries seeking to attract qualified volunteers.
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Country Military Housing Child Care Other Family-Friendly Benefits
Belgium
Housing generally not
provided; a few govern-
ment-owned houses
available for rental;
members abroad receive
cash allowance
Limited services available in 7 loca-
tions until age 3
Subsidized hospitalization insurance
for families
Canada
Government is getting
out of the housing busi-
ness; Canadian Forces
Housing Authority main-
tains housing, disposes of
it for government; mem-
bers get location-
dependent housing al-
lowance and are charged
prevailing local rents for
CFHA housing
Family resource centers include sub-
sidized child care
Counseling and other services at
on-base family resource centers; the
centers are new, and members com-
plain they are underresourced and
ignored
Czech
Republic
New, generous, location-
dependent housing
allowance; housing no
longer provided in-kind
for career officers
Not available Family support programs planned
France
Government provides
shared rooms on base for
privates; low-cost studios
or apartments on base
for NCOs; MOD estate
agency owns some apart-
ments for rent by officers
at below-market rates.
Not provided
Higher pay for members with fami-
lies; military holiday centers; family
assistance centers; health care for
family members; subsidized insur-
ance; discounts on rail travel; special
pays to offset strain of military du-
ties on families
Germany
Some government hous-
ing available to members
at below-market rates
Creating child-care centers Government pays cost of relocation
Italy
Government housing
available for officers,
NCOs; may be provided
to volunteer career
soldiers
Reimbursement of crèche expenses
Government pays costs of reloca-
tion; tax reduction based upon fam-
ily size
Norway
Government provides
housing for up to four
years (longer in rural ar-
eas) at new posting
Government assisted local commu-
nities in establishing child-care cen-
ters open to military and
nonmilitary families
None described
Romania
Government provides
housing in garrison for
members and families; if
unavailable, member re-
ceives housing allowance
equal to 50% of monthly
wage; recently launched
program to build new
houses for members and
their families
Low-cost child-care centers in larger
garrisons
Free medical care and medication
provided through military medical
facilities; free or discount access to
military sports areas and recre-
ational facilities; reimbursement of
transportation during vacations
TABLE 5
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Seek Recruits from Nontraditional or Underrepresented Sources. Like the United
States during the 1970s, Europe’s militaries are seeking to expand the pool of
prospective volunteers by opening more jobs to women. The German
Bundeswehr, for example, which just a few years ago permitted women only in
the music corps and the medical profession, now opens all jobs to women.56 In
addition, some of Europe’s militaries are placing more emphasis on recruiting
less-advantaged and minority citizens, immigrants, and even foreigners. Spain
is actively recruiting service members from South America and Guinea; it cur-
rently limits to 2,400 the number of service members from those regions, but it
is considering raising that figure.57 The Bundeswehr is particularly attractive to
volunteers from eastern Germany, even though military pay is lower for those
born in the East than for West Germans.58 The Royal Netherlands forces are
looking to tap into the “unused potential” of the ethnic minority population.59
Belgium’s strategic plan recommends opening military recruitment to all Euro-
pean citizens, thus raising the specter of an east-west migration within Europe’s
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Country Military Housing Child Care Other Family-Friendly Benefits
Slovak
Republic
Government-provided
accommodation for con-
scripts and students of
military schools; apart-
ments or military hostels
for all members, or al-
lowance to rent nearby;
soldier pays for family
members in hostels
Summer camps in military facilities
for children of members
Recreation in military facilities; dis-
counts for foreign travel
Spain
After 5 years of service,
cash bonus to offset costs
of housing transition at
every change of post;
some military housing
Child-care centers in some units
Some scholarships available for chil-
dren; access to medical care for
families
United
Kingdom
Housing provided for all
members, with type of
housing based on rank
For officers, cash allowance toward
private education for children
Allowances for relocation; child wel-
fare assistance, family support ser-
vices, and medical treatment for
families posted overseas; confiden-
tial support telephone line for mili-
tary members and families.
United
States
Government provides
housing for majority of
single members and
about 30 percent of
members with families;
others receive housing al-
lowance based on rank,
family status, and
location
Government provides on-base
child-care centers at subsidized cost
that varies by family income (lower
cost for lower income)
On-base family assistance centers;
access to military recreation facili-
ties; subsidized on-base grocery and
department stores; health care for
family members provided directly
by government or through insur-
ance at no cost to member; others
TABLE 5 CONTINUED
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militaries.60 Unfortunately, however, many of Europe’s immigrants may find
military service unattractive, and Europeans may find that their efforts in this
aspect of the transition are not as fruitful as the successful U.S. model of attract-
ing minorities and other youth who see the military as a good opportunity.
Improve the Post-service Employment Prospects of Service Members. Like the United
States, European countries hope to attract a share of their recruits through the
prospect of a good future “on the outside” after they serve for a few years in the
military. However, differences in educational systems and labor mobility make
for substantial differences in the mechanisms for improving post-service pros-
pects. While initial training in a skill valued outside the military, combined
with money for college, can be crucial in the U.S. case, the prevalence of
high-quality trades training in the high schools in some European countries
means that many European youth are more likely to be attracted by transition
assistance and training as they depart service, and by the guarantee of public-
sector jobs afterward.
Thus, for its twelve-year enlisted volunteers, Germany provides a full year of
training at the end of service, followed by a full year of government pay in a tran-
sitional job in the private sector. Spain offers its volunteers two to ten months of
training in an occupational specialty at the beginning of their careers and addi-
tional training for the return to the private sector. In addition, Spain’s volunteers
now have the opportunity to receive degrees as “military technicians,” which the
Ministry of Defense hopes will help soldiers and sailors as they return to civilian
life. The Netherlands also plans to invest in training courses where needed to
help service members transition to civilian employment. Romania is establish-
ing a career-assistance program for veteran volunteers. The ministries of defense
of Italy and the Netherlands have established new offices to tap into the private
sector and help volunteers find jobs as they leave the military. In addition, the
Italian Ministry of Defense will now pay for six months of training as volunteer
members depart service. Belgium is considering new programs to provide retrain-
ing for volunteers at the end of their contracts and to award diplomas and other
skills accreditation that will be recognized in the private sector.61
In some countries, perhaps the most important transition initiative is to re-
serve a substantial share of public-sector jobs for military volunteers. Italy guar-
antees a job at the end of military service for every volunteer. The Italian
government reserves 60 percent of Carabinieri, 50 percent of national police
force, and 45 percent of national forest police and firefighting jobs for
short-term military volunteers; eventually all national police posts will be re-
served for them. Spain reserves 60 percent of Guardia Civil posts for veterans;
the Spanish Ministry of Defense is negotiating agreements with other ministries
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to hold jobs for separating soldiers and sailors. In addition, the Spanish govern-
ment is reaching out to private-sector employers’ organizations in the hopes
that they will set jobs aside for veteran volunteers. Belgium has opened its civil-
ian jobs in ministries to former service members. In other European countries,
ministries of defense are making arrangements with employer associations, la-
bor associations, and other public agencies to assist former service members
with placement.62
The European model of substantial end-of-service training, government-
paid post-service jobs, and nearly guaranteed post-service employment may
cost more than the American system of money for college and training necessary
for duties in the military. The high costs of post-service training and placement
will likely eat into national resources that might otherwise be available for mili-
tary equipment.
Improve Recruitment Efforts. Finally, as in the United States during the 1970s,
European militaries are working to boost recruiting through professional re-
cruiting teams, mass-media advertising, and other measures.
In summary, the countries in transition are working to develop creative solu-
tions to the specific challenges they face. Some of the steps they are taking resem-
ble those the United States found beneficial during its transition phase.
Nevertheless, profound differences in the demographic, social, economic, and
labor settings of Europe and the United States may make the European transi-
tions take longer and cost more than the American one, or than NATO’s leaders
currently hope.
MODERN, EXPEDITIONARY, HIGH-TECHNOLOGY
NATO’s member states rely increasingly on volunteers to fill their military ranks.
A growing number of European countries suspended compulsory service dur-
ing the past decade or are now phasing it out. American and NATO leaders be-
lieve the all-volunteer model is more consistent with a modern, expeditionary,
high-technology military.
Military personnel policies vary across NATO countries. Views of the appro-
priate balance between military capability and equity for individuals within a
military also seem to vary. For example, what sounds to a Western European like
reasonable equity and career stability can sound to an American like a jobs pro-
gram. Conversely, suggestions by U.S. experts that European militaries should re-
duce the number of people in uniform and change their personnel policies to free
up money for high-technology weapons can strike Europeans as self-serving
attempts to develop partners for a style of war they would prefer not to fight, and
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to drum up customers for weapons they would rather not buy. Similarly, to
Americans, the quasi–trade union associations that represent many European
service members can seem antithetical to a strong military, while to Europeans
such organizations can seem central to protecting the rights of military mem-
bers as “citizens in uniform.”
Across the alliance, the military drawdowns of the past fifteen years created
personnel management challenges. In some countries, they resulted in severe
staffing imbalances that will take years or even decades to reverse. Moreover, the
transition from conscription to an all-volunteer force creates its own challenges.
Among other problems, nations that have undertaken it recently are finding the
costs higher than they planned for.
The United States faced similar problems, but efforts along multiple fronts
brought success within a decade. European militaries are undertaking similar ef-
forts, tailored to their own national environments. But demographic, social, and
other realities in most of Europe are different from those of the United States.
Unfortunately, the differences are likely to make it more difficult and expensive,
not less so, for Europe’s militaries to attract, retain, and motivate high-quality
volunteers and to induce them to leave when their services are no longer needed.
As a result, AVF transitions in Europe may take longer and be more difficult and
more costly than the American experience of the 1970s and early 1980s.
The implications of all this for narrowing the military capabilities gap are not
good. Even a transition period as brief as that of the United States could mean
that the expected improvements would not be evident for a decade after an
armed service said good-bye to its last conscript. If the transitions take longer,
the high cost of personnel will continue to drain resources from equipment ac-
counts. More fundamentally, if the quality of recruits does not improve within a
few years, troops will lack skills and cognitive aptitudes necessary to operate and
maintain the high-technology equipment required to narrow the gap.
NOTE S
1. Much of the information for this article is
drawn from a transatlantic roundtable, “Fill-
ing NATO’s Ranks: Military Personnel Pol-
icies in Transition,” held at the Transatlantic
Center of the German Marshall Fund of the
United States in Brussels, Belgium, 8–9 Sep-
tember 2003. Participants at the roundtable
included experts on military personnel poli-
cies from twelve NATO countries. In addition
to providing presentations at the meeting, a
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